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THE APPEAL
Alex Kozinski and Alexander Volokht

t Alex Kozinski is a federal judge in California; Alexander "Sasha" Volokh is
his law clerk. Kozinski and Volokh are widely respected, the latter for his brains,
the former for his looks. - Ed.
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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUI T

UNITED STATES,

No. 25-1883

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

OPINION

JOSEFK.,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
Hermann Bendemann, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 3, 1926
Filed May

1, 2005

Before: Alex K.,* Bucephalus and Godot,** Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Alex K. ***

* No relation.
** Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291. Judge Godot was not
present at oral argument but will read the transcript as soon as he gets here.
*** As is the custom in the federal courts today, every word of this opinion
was written by Judge K.'s law clerk, Sasha V. (The common delusion that judges
actually write the stuff they author has led to some misunderstandings. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1062 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring) (referring to "a [surprising] communication from Judge
K").) The judge merely read the text and fiddled with the language (but Sasha V.
managed to reverse most of the changes in later drafts). It is well known that the
judge never reads the footnotes.
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COUNSEL

Odradek, for appellant.
Public Prosecutor Hasterer, Office of Prosecution, for appellee.

OPINION

ALEX K., Circuit Judge:
1
FACTS
The late

Josef K.,

a

thirty-something male,

claims

that

"[s]omeone must have slandered [him], for one morning, without
having done anything truly wrong, he was arrested." T.R. 3.
The procedural history of this case is complicated and patchy,
but what is clear is that, after being rude to his arresting officers,
appellant came late to his initial interrogation and disrupted
2
the proceedings. He refused to attend further interrogations,
submitted no evidence or brief in his defense and repeatedly
3
accused judicial authorities of corruption and incompetence.
He was apparently convicted, though the conviction does not
appear in the record. On the eve of his thirty-first birthday, K. was
taken to a quarry by two guards and executed. "With failing sight
K. saw how the men drew near his face, leaning cheek-to-cheek to

observe the verdict. 'Like a dog!' he said; it seemed as though the
shame was to outlive him." T.R. 231. As it has.
K. appeals, alleging unlawful arrest, inadequate notice, due

1

The trial record in this case has been published as Franz Kafka, The Trial
(Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books) (1925). We regret the delay in disposing
of the appeal, but we've been busy with more important matters. See, e.g., Alex K.
& Sidney T., Don't Split the Ninth Circuit!, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at A16.
2Tuis is not the only case where appellant has been "loud, emotional,
expressed paranoid notions and lacked self control." See Alameda County Soc.
Servs. Agency v. Joseph K. (In re Randi K.), 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5427,
*3 (June 9, 2004).
3
We could end right here, for what else need there be said? Nevertheless, we
will continue so no one can accuse us of "prejudging the case" or giving appellant
"short shrift." No doubt, appellant will be much happier to lose based on a post
judged, long-shrift opinion.
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process violations, systemic corruption, ineffective assistance of
counsel and actual innocence. We affirm. See, e.g., State v. Sams a,
199 1 Ohio App. LEXIS 2483, at * 1 (May 29, 199 1) ("We
affirm.").
ANALYSIS
1. The government claims the case was mooted by appellant's
death. But appellant casts aspersions on the legitimacy of the legal
proceedings against him, and his calumny cannot be left
unrebutted. Not contra Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 16 n.8
( 1998) (damage to reputation of mere parties does not defeat
mootness).
The government seems to argue, though incoherently, that we
lack jurisdiction because the events in question took place abroad.
K. responds that the Supreme Court's rulings in Sosa v. Alvarez
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2 739 ( 2004), and Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240 ( 2004), give us jurisdiction over events
anywhere, anytime. We are inclined to take K.'s word for it, as we
can't bring ourselves to slog through over eighty pages of the
4
Supreme Court Reporter.
2.
K. challenges the authority of the officers to enter his
apartment, claiming that he was unlawfully "assault[ed] . .. in his
own lodgings." T.R. 6. But K. waived this argument when he got
out of bed and told the arresting officer he was going to ask his
landlady about the disturbance. The record clearly shows that K.
"realized at once that he shouldn't have spoken aloud, and that by
doing so he had, in a sense, acknowledged the stranger's right to
oversee his actions. " T.R. 4; cf Christian v. United States, 394
A.2d 1, 38 (D.C. 1978) (per curiam) ("[T]he defendant can waive,
through his silence, a constitutional right . ...") .
K. urges that we ignore his oversight because "that didn't seem
important at the moment." T. R. 4. But police actions are to be
judged by their objective reasonableness at the time, not in
hindsight or according to defendant's shifting mental state. See
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 ( 199 1) (objective
4what gets into them sometimes? See also McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619
(2003) (168 pages of Supreme Court Reporter never read by anyone).
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reasonableness under the circumstances); cf In re Samsa, 8 6 B.R .
863, 865 (Banla. W.D. Pa. 1988) (court must consider law at time
of transaction).
Even though he was under arrest, K. was still allowed to
"carry[] on [his] profession" and was not "hindered in the course
5
of [his] ordinary life." T.R. 17. Also, K. admitted that the arrest
"ma[de him] laugh," T.R. 47, and that, to the extent the incident
tended to "spread the news of [his] arrest [and] damage [his]
public reputation, and in particular to undermine [his] position at
the bank," "none of this met with the slightest success." T.R. 48.
Without cognizable harm, K. lacks standing to contest his arrest.
De minimis non curat lex.
3. While we're on the subject of trifles, we address K.'s claim
that he was arrested without a warrant. At the time of the arrest, K.
showed the guard his identification papers and demanded, in
return, to see the guard's papers and the arrest warrant. T.R. 8. Not
only was he not shown these, he was also told that the guards
"weren't sent to tell" him why he was arrested. T.R. 5.
We see no problem. Before ordering an arrest, the authorities
"inform themselves in great detail about the person they're
arresting and the grounds for the arrest." T.R. 8. They don't "seek
out guilt among the general population, but . . . [are] attracted by
guilt . . . . That's the Law." T.R. 8-9; see also Deel. of Penal
Colony Officer ("Guilt is always beyond a doubt."); Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (arrest warrant not necessary for
arrest supported by probable cause).

K. argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the
initial hearing: He wasn't told the hour of his hearing and he
complains that the court didn't "describe(] the location of the room
more precisely," alleging that this somehow amounts to "strange
4.

5

He was fortunate to have guards who were friendly with him, though this
"exceed[ed] [their] instructions" and was "against all regulations." T.R. 5. K.'s
guards even offered to hold his personal possessions for safekeeping while his case
was pending instead of forcing him to take his chances with the depository, which
would have sold the possessions at below-market prices and might never have
returned the proceeds to him.T.R.5-6; see also T.R.81 ("[I]t's a tradition that the
undergarments belong to the guards ...."); Psalms 22:18 (King James) ("[T]hey
divide my garments among them, and for my raiment they cast lots."); Washington
v.

Glucksberg, 521

U.S.

702, 710 (1997) ("We begin ... by examining our Nation's

history, legal traditions, and practices." (emphasis added)).
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carelessness or indifference." T.R. 35, 39.
K.'s problems are of his own making. Court calendars are
published, and citizens are presumed to know every word of all
official publications. See Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380, 384-85 (1947). K. admits that he came an hour and five
minutes late because he did not "have the least desire to humble
himself before the commission of inquiry by being overly
punctual. " T.R. 38. He "decided to observe more than speak " and
merely said, "I may have arrived late, but I'm here now, " and thus
"waived any defense of his . . . late arrival. " T.R. 43.
Rather than give it up, K. challenges the substance of his
initial interrogation. He alleges that the proceedings were
"sloppy, " indeed, that they were not even "proceedings at all. "
T.R. 45. We need not delve too deeply into this argument: The
examining magistrate correctly remarked that, in view of K.'s
lateness, he had no duty to even examine K., but exercised his
discretion to make an exception in K.'s case. T.R. 43. We find no
abuse of discretion.
But even if we were to reach the merits of K.'s argument, we
would find it meritless. K. points to the examining magistrate's
mistakes of fact, notably his erroneous characterization of K. as a
house painter. T.R. 44. But this mistake was clearly harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967), since the record does not disclose what the actual
charge was and we therefore can't say that the mistake was even
relevant.
Moreover, with his displays of histrionics and rudeness to the
examining magistrate, K. "deprived [himself] . . . of the advantage
that an interrogation offers to the arrested man in each case. " T.R.
52-53; see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 313 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). This uncooperativeness
continued throughout the entire course of the proceedings. K.
"wantonly disturb[ed] " the legal process and virtually brought the
"violent measures he had thus far been spared " on himself. T.R.
251. K. can "do as he wishe[s], but he should bear in mind that the
high court [can]not permit itself to be mocked. " T.R. 252; see
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) ("[A] defendant can
lose his right to be present at trial if . . . he . . . insists on
conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and
5.

The Appeal

May2005]

1397

disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with
him in the courtroom.").6
Finally, K. comments that his case "is typical of the
proceedings being brought against many people. I speak for them,
not for myself. " T.R. 46-47. This case has not been certified as a
class action, and to the extent that K. disclaims any challenge to
harms he himself has suffered, he lacks standing. See Note,
Standin.p To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 423
( 1974).
has already waived any claim against his arresting
officers, leaving only his claims against supervisory officials and
government entities. See T.R. 83 ("I don't even consider [my
arresting guards] guilty; it's the organization that's guilty, it's the
high officials who are guilty."); Monell v. Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690 ( 1978).
K. produces no evidence for his claim that "an extensive
organization " of corrupt officials, the purpose of which is
"arresting innocent people and introducing senseless proceedings
against them, " was behind his arrest, beyond the conclusory
assertion that "[t]here can be no doubt " about it. T.R. 50; see
Samsa v. Comm 'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1 10 1 ( 198 1), at *7
(testimony need not be accepted where it is "improbable,
unreasonable or questionable "); Alex K. & Eugene V., Lawsuit,
Shmawsuit, 103 Yale L.J. 463, 467 ( 1993) ("Chutzpah."). To the
contrary, the members of our judicial system are conscientious and
hard-working. Court employees are "poorly dressed, in old
fashioned clothes; it doesn't make much sense to spend anything
on clothing, since [they're] almost always in the offices, and even
8
sleep [there]." T.R. 76. They belong to the Law, and thus are
beyond human judgment. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. ( 13
Wall.) 335, 347 ( 187 1) (judges have absolute immunity for
judicial acts). To doubt their dignity is to doubt the Law itself.
T. R. 222-23.
6.

K.

6This is so tedious, I wonder if anyone is still reading. For this I ate 6000 stale
bagels at Gannett House?
7But see Sasha V., n Guilty Men, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173 (1997) (brilliantly
proving that proceedings are not fair unless they guarantee release of those who
are suilty).
"No kidding. Eugene V. never told me about this. See also infra note 9.
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K.'s most substantial claim is ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
K. complains that his lawyer, Dr. Huld, didn't s ummon him for
over a month, and generally scarcely asked any questions, instead
sitting across from K. in silence or giving K. empty admonitions
and useless, self-congratulatory speeches. T.R. 112. After months,
K. alleges, Huld still hadn't prepared an initial petition. T.R. 177.
This looks bad, but it's not as if the lawyer was asleep during trial.
See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 348-49 (5th Cir.
2001) (en bane).
In any event, we can't rule out that Huld's supposed
deficiencies were in fact K.'s fault. K. could have contacted the
lawyer sooner. T.R. 123. His bad experience may be attributable to
the fact that he was a bad client: He insisted on pursuing a high
stress professional career and only showed up at times convenient
to him rather than, like other clients, being "quiet and industrious,"
T.R. 194, abandoning most of his professional commitments, T.R.
173-74, and sleeping in Huld's house in case Huld needed to talk
to him, T.R. 182; see also T.R. 192 (client on his knees before the
9
lawyer); T.R. 193 (client kissing the lawyer's hand).
K. also took the "unheard of . . . and quite insulting" step of
firing his lawyer during the trial. T.R. 125. Who knows how
effective Huld would have been if he had been allowed to do his
job? See, e.g., Smith v. Ylst, 8 2 6 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1987)
(even a mentally ill lawyer can be effective). At the very least,
Huld is highly competent. Merchant Rudolf Block, one of Huld's
longtime clients, testified regarding both Huld's competence and
considerable personal contacts, T.R. 116, the latter being perhaps
the most relevant element in determining Huld's ability: While the
court is impervious to proof brought before it, "it's another matter
when it comes to behind-the-scene efforts, in the conference
10
rooms, [or] in the corridors." T.R. 150-51.
Moreover, K. cannot show any prejudice from Huld's failure to
prepare a petition. Block, for instance, found his own petitions
"entirely worthless" and containing "nothing of substance,"
7.

9

Sounds a lot like a law clerk. See supra note 8.
10
K.'s implicit claim that such contacts are unsavory and should be discouraged

collapses of its own weight. Is there a courthouse anywhere that does not have
corridors and conference rooms? Obviously they're there for a purpose.
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consisting mainly of Latin, general appeals to the court, flattery of
individual officials, self-praise, and "almost canine servility."
T.R. 177. What cause have we to believe that K. 's petition, if
prepared, would have been any better?
We are tom about K.'s ineffective assistance claim. On the one
hand, we must promote the strong public policy against defense
lawyers. "[T]he defense is not actually countenanced by the Law,
but only tolerated, and there is even some controversy as to
whether the relevant passages of the Law can truly be construed to
include even such tolerance." T.R. 114. Lambasting K.'s lawyer
for incompetence would thus serve an important public purpose.
On the other hand, we must also give effect to the strong public
policy of ruling against criminal defendants. See, e.g., United
States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 2 40 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
bane) (MacKinnon, J., concurring) ("[M]ost defendants are
gm·1ty .. . .").
Though it is a close case, we side with the lawyer, who, after
all, had to put up with appellant's officiousness. "[A]lmost every
defendant, even the most simple-minded among them, starts
thinking up suggestions for improvement from the moment the
trial starts, and in doing so often wastes time and energy that
would be better spent in other ways." T.R. 119. "One should leave
the task to the lawyers, instead of interfering with them." T.R. 120;
see, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551, 557 (2004) ('"In this
case, there won't be any question, none whatsoever, that my
client . . .caused [the victim's] death.' ").
8. K.'s only clear claim is that he is innocent. See, e.g., T.R.
4 7, 148, 2 13. But how can K. credibly claim innocence when he
admits to not knowing the law? T.R. 9. He might as well dispute
what the meaning of "is " is. The fuss he makes about how
innocent he feels "disturbs the otherwise not unfavorable
impression [he] make[s]." T.R. 14. Especially ludicrous is his
suggestion that no one can "in general be guilty," as "[w]e're all
human after all, each and every one of us." T.R. 2 13. That's how
guilty people always talk.
In any event-and this is the nub of the matter-we fail to see
what's so special about being innocent. See Commonwealth v.
Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 665 (Mass. 1997) ("(O]nce the
[criminal] process has run its course . .. the community's interest
in finality comes to the fore."). We will assume, for the sake of
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argument, that K. did not commit the crime for which he was
convicted and executed. Can we be sure that K. did not commit
some other, worse crime, that was overlooked? To ask the question
is to answer it. The law works in mysterious ways and that which
should be done is presumed to have been done. It follows that that
which was done needed doing. K. was convicted and executed
after a legal process that, as we have seen, is unimpeachable. He
must have deserved what he got.
CONCLUSION
K. 's overarching complaint, that "the Law should be accessible
to anyone at any time " and that he has been denied entry to it, T.R.
216, "rings hollow." Alex K., Scholarship of the Absurd: Bob
Bork Meets the Bald Soprano, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1578, 1583
(1992). The very existence of these proceedings has provided an
entrance for K. to defend himself. K. has consistently refused to
cooperate with court officials' repeated attempts "to straighten out
his complex case, regardless of the time and cost." T.R. 251. No
one else could gain admittance here, because this entrance was
meant solely for him. If he nevertheless remained outside, he has
only himself to blame.
AFFIRMED.

